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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

Case No. 12994
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

-vsDARNELL L. GARCIA,
Defendant and
Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal brought by the State

of Utah from an Order made by the Honorable
Calvin Gould whereby the Court arrested

and vacated a Judgment heard by the Trier
of Facts in a criminal prosecution thereby
discharging the Defendant-Respondent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Respondent, Darnell L. Garcia,
Wcts

tried for burglary in the second degree

l

on May 18, 1972, wherein the Honorable Calvin
Gould sitting as a presiding Judge for the
District Court of the Second Judicial District
in Weber County, Utah, did arrest and vacate
a Judgment as to the guilt of the DefendantRespondent and discharged the DefendantRespondent based upon the Court's belief
that an imposition of sentence as against
the Respondent would be an unjust and unequal
dispensing of punishment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks an Order dismissing
the Appeal of the Plaintiff based upon the
authority of the District Court to impose
sentence or discharge a Defendant where
the Court has been the Trier of Facts.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As Arnicus Curiae, the writer will not
restate any of the facts inasmuch as two
opposite positions have been taken on the
facts by the Appellant and by the Respondent,
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the court having the record before it shall
make its own determination as to the correctness

of the facts and as to the materiality of
some of the assertions therein.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
FACTS CONSIDERED BY COURT IN
RENDERING VERDI~T NOT REVIEWABLE
The Appellant seeks to review the Judgment

of the Lower District Court upon the factual
basis, that the Court in dismissing the
cause of action as to the Defendant-Respondent
made certain statements relating to facts
as to the Court's basis for refusing to

find the Respondent guilty and thereupon
negated the authority of the Court to exonerate
the Defendant from sentence in the Lower

Court.
This Court had occasion to discuss
the relationship of the motivation and expression:

of a District Court Judge in rendering a
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criminal verdict in the case of State vs.
Martin, 49 Ut. 346, 164 P. 500, March 23,

1917, wherein the Court before passing sentence
reviewed the past record of the Defendant
and in doing so referred to matters that
were not a part of the record in the case
at bar, but which had come out at a former
trial of the Defendant and which occurred
before the same Judge who tried the case
at bar, and wherein the matters related
to, or were connected with, the circumstances
shown at the trial before the Court.

The

question before the Court in that case was
whether or not the Supreme Court can review
a matter which merely reflects the mental
attitude of the trial Judge, which is the
result of what the trial Judge heard and
saw during two trials of the Defendant.
This Court stated:
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"**The mental attitude of the
Judge, whether expressed or
not, in passing Judgment, cannot
be made a matter for review
by this Court."
The Court had the authority as the
Trier of Facts to render a verdict of not
guilty as to the party involved, or upon
finding the Defendant guilty, to render
a suspended or probationary penalty as to
the Respondent and it is submitted that
the final act of the Court in not rendering
a Judgment against the Respondent was fully
within the statutory authority of the Court
as a Trier of Facts which in accordance
with State vs. Martin, supra, this Court
has stated:
"The sentence therefore strictly
conforms to the statute, and,
that being the case, we are
powerless to declare it illegal,
or even erroneous.
The question
presented by counsel therefore
is not one that is reviewable
by this Court, but under our
Constitution may be presented
to the Board of Pardons, ***"
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State vs. Fedder, et al., 262 P.2d
753, Sup.Ct. Utah, Oct. 30, 1953, was a
case wherein the Defendant entered a plea

of guilty to a charge of receiving stolen
goods and the Defendant was placed on probation
and subsequent thereto an Order to Show
Cause why probation should not be revoked
was issued.

The Defendant entered a Motion

to Quash the Order and the Lower Court Judge
entered Judgment denying the Motion to Quash.
This Court held that there is no distinctior
between the words "Judgment" and "sentence"
and as in the instant case here before the
Court where the Court declared the legal
consequence of its verdict as being that
no sentence would be imposed and where there
was no other conduct of the Court in imposing
Probation, then the "sentence" or "Judgment"

of the Court must be taken as a final determinati
of not guilty as to the Respondent herein.
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It has been clearly documented by citations
and Statutes, that the discretion of the
Judiciary is restricted only by specific
statutory bounds, and the Supreme Court

of Arizona in Varela vs. Merrill, 51 Ariz.
64, 74 P.2d 569, 1937, well defined the
discretionary authority of the Court when
it stated:
"***There are no rules prescribed as
to when this discretion shall be
exercised, or as to what evidence
is necessary to satisfy the Trial
Judge, that the case is a proper
one for its exercise.
Indeed,
it would be almost impossible to
present a case which could justify
this Court in finding that the
Trial Court had abused its discretion
in regards to whether sentence
should be suspended or not."
In the instant case before this
Honorable Court, the fact that the Court
was the Trier of Facts and used its
discretion in what it considered the
best interest of justice and in exercising

the traditional authority of a Court,
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and particularly as a Trier of Facts,
to determine the proper "sentence" or "Judgment".
in a proceedings before the Bench cannot
oow be said to be an abuse of the discre-

tion of a District Court Judge.
In the matter of Habeas Corpus of
James P. Duty, Petitioner, 318 P.2d 900,
the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma,
Nov. 27, 1957, the Court held that where
the Trial Court has jurisdiction of the
person, the subject matter, and authority
to pronounce the Judgment and sentence
rendered, and nothing occurs to deprive
the Trial Court of jurisdiction, no other
elements are necessary for a valid Judgment.
In United States vs. Hetherington,
279 F.2d 792, 7th Circuit, cert. denied
364 U.S. 908, 81 Sup.Ct. 271, 1960, the

Court held that legal sentences are not
subject to review, "except possibly for
manifest abuse of discretion."
8

•

Livers vs. United States, 185 F.2d
807, 6th Circuit, 1950, the Court held
that a sentencing Judge's discretion will
not be disturbed on Appeal, "except upon
a plain showing of gross abuse."

Tincher vs. United States, 11 F.2d

18, 4th Circuit, cert. denied 271 U.S.
664, 46 Sup.Ct. 475, 1926, the Court held
that a sentencing Judge's discretion should
not be disturbed, "except in cases of gross
or palpable abuse."
POINT II
DISCHARGE OF RESPONDENT AFTER
HEARING AND JUDGMENT IS FINAL
In the People vs. Superior Court of
Marion County, 72 Cal.Rep. 330, 446 P.2d

138, Sup. Ct. of California, Oct. 31, 1968,
the Court held that the State's Petition
for a Writ of Mandate to compel the Respondent's
Superior court to vacate an Order dismissing
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information in the interest of justice
did not lie.

In this case, the Trial Judge

dismissed the information on its own Motion
after the jury had returned a verdict finding
the Defendant guilty of two counts of robbery
in the first degree.
The Court stated that the restriction
on the People's right to appeal is not
merely a procedural limitation allocating
Appellate review between direct appeals
in extra ordinary risks, but is a substantive
limitation on review of Trial Court's determinat]
in criminal trials.

The Supreme Court

held that the Superior Court was the ultimate
tribunal as long as it did not exceed its
jurisdiction and that error in the exercise
of its jurisdiction may not be reviewed
by any other tribunal.

The Attorney General in this case
further contended that the Court had no
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nowc;r to dismiss after a jury verdict of
~uilty

and that to do so constituted an

abuse of discretion.

The Court alleged

that the discretion of the Judge is absolute
except where the legislature has specifically
curtailed such discretion.
In People vs. Sidener, 58 Cal.2d 645,
375 P.2d 641,

the Court stated that the

Courts were vested with a Conunon Law power
of nolle prosequi and that the Conunon Law
power permitted an entry of nolle prosequi
before the jury was empaneled while the
case was before the jury, or after verdict.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted to this
Court that there is a broad discretionary
power vested in the Judges of the District
Courts of the State of Utah, and that in
a particular action where the Judge is
also the Trier of Facts, that the ultimate
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"sentence" or "Judgment" rendered by the
court is a final Judgment and should be
subject to review only upon a deprivation
of constitutional rights of the Defendant
or abuse of the statutory authority of
the Lower Court, and that the prosecuting
Attorney does not have the ultimate and
final authority to override the final Judgment
of the District Court Judge.
Respectfully submitted,

DAVID B. HAVAS
DAVID B. HAVAS
Ogden Civil Liberties Union
as Amicus Curiae for Respondent
Suite 312 Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
84401
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